LEY 24766 PDF

Finance Services. This part-time post is on a permanent contract. The post holder will support the Student Funding Manager in the delivery of all aspects relating to the provision of the administration of student bursaries, scholarships, studentships, fee waivers and other funding schemes for the University in accordance with the University's procedures, policy and regulations. The post holder will report directly to the Student Funding Manager and will be the operational lead for the day to day running of the Student Funding Team in her absence. The post holder will also need to have previous experience of supervising and motivating a team, excellent customer service and a methodical approach; accuracy, numeracy and attention to detail are all important aspects of the job. They will also need to prioritise and plan a varied workload to respond to peaks of work, have a friendly and flexible approach to work and be an excellent team player.

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Competition is equally protected. The Federal Constitution establishes that the authorities will provide for 'the defence of competition against any method of market distortion, and the control of natural and legal monopolies'. In spite of the potential tensions between these two areas, up to the present they have largely developed independently from one another. Law No. It prohibits conduct related to the manufacture and sale of goods and services that have the object or effect of limiting, restricting or distorting competition or entry into a market, or that constitute an abuse of a dominant position, only if such conduct may harm the general economic interest, a concept associated to economic efficiency and consumer welfare.

Hardcore cartels are considered per se illegal, while all other conduct is subject to a rule of reason analysis.

The Competition Law is regulated by Decree No. There are no specific limitations concerning the amount of royalties, terms of duration, level of exports or excluding the licensor's product liability, submission to foreign jurisdiction, etc. However, terms and conditions of the agreements between related parties mainly between controlling and controlled companies should be in accordance with the arm's-length principle.

On 9 May , the Competition Law was enacted. The law substantially increases the fines, incorporates a leniency programme for cartel practices and will create a new, independent agency whose formation is expected to occur later in In addition, the current antitrust agency, the National Commission for the Defence of Competition CNDC , 2 issued several guidelines and draft guidelines on matters such as merger control, exclusionary abuse of dominance and leniency.

Few cases have been resolved under the Competition Law in the past 12 months. However, a number of cases have been decided based on the former competition law, Law No. Among those, the most notable is Sadaic, in which a collective rights organisation was found to abuse its dominant position in the granting of authorisations for the broadcasting of musical and audiovisual works by engaging in abusive and discriminatory pricing.

Generally, the terms of a licence agreement are within the scope of the IPRs owner's exclusive rights. In addition, the Patent Law provides for the possibility of granting compulsory licences on antitrust grounds. From an antitrust perspective, anticompetitive restraints imposed on licensing agreements will generally be considered as unilateral conducts, and as such, subject to a rule of reason analysis. The use of price limitations in particular, the establishment of minimum resale prices regarding a licence could be considered an anticompetitive practice under Section 3 a of the Competition Law.

Other types of restrictions, such as contractual quantity limitations and field-of-use restrictions, may have an anticompetitive effect to the extent they are deemed to limit output particularly if they are combined with territorial restrictions.

Territorial and customer restrictions generally do not raise antitrust concerns, as long as they do not involve a horizontal division of territories, markets or clients e.

The inclusion of non-assertion restrictions in licence agreements may lead to the imposition of sanctions under the Competition Law, depending on their impact on the market. In an illustrative list of conduct patterns that may be considered anticompetitive, Section 3 e of the Competition Law addresses potential restrictions on the market through agreements to control or limit research and technological development.

Similar conduct patterns affecting licensees are forbidden under Section 38 of the Patent Law. Agreements creating ACEs must be registered with the Public Registry of Commerce and reported before the antitrust agency, which may examine these under the merger control provisions or as a horizontal cooperation agreement.

Section 38 of the Patent Law specifically states that these types of clauses shall not be included in licence agreements. Section 3 f of the Competition Law prohibits tying the sale of a good or service to the acquisition or use of another good or service, if the general assumptions provided for in Section 1 restriction to competition and injury to the general economic interest are met. The scope of the provision is broad enough to include not only tying agreements but also package licensing of patents and copyrights.

Further, Sections 38 and 44 of the Patent Law prohibit clauses that include compulsory package licensing. Local case law includes a number of cases concerning broadcasting rights to specific football matches that were sold in combination with other football matches or sports events.

Durford Commercial Corporation, the defendant was the exclusive licensee of TV rights for pre-World Cup football matches, and was allegedly charging excessive prices for those events to a free-to-air FTA channel and tying them to the sale of different matches, selling them in a package format only. The CNDC concluded that the licensor had a dominant position, as substitutability of rights to such football events was quite low. Nevertheless, the CNDC approved the packaged licences, concluding that its prices could not be considered excessive, given that it had to pay substantial sums to purchase the rights from the sports leagues and that the defendant could make a reasonable return on its investment by licensing the events to cable companies which were willing to buy the entire package, and at a price much higher than that offered by FTA systems.

Thus, the CNDC held that the defendant's refusal to license individual matches to the complainant was reasonable. Telered Imagen SA and others, the National Commercial Appeal Court confirmed the lower court's decision that stated that the defendants programmers abused their dominant position by tying unwanted events to football events over which they had broadcasting rights and ordered the unbundling of the programmes and required the licence fee to be set based on the football events alone.

Companies have the right to choose freely with whom and under what conditions to market their products, and thus, refusing to sell a certain good or service or to grant a licence to a certain customer is not usually a practice that will be considered a violation of the Competition Law.

Unjustified refusal to satisfy particular licensing requests is specifically considered under Section 3 i of the Competition Law and under Section 42 of the Patent Law. In light of the above, the INPI may authorise the use of a patent without a licence if the potential user has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a licence from its owner under reasonable commercial terms for consecutive days. It is debated whether this disposition applies only to those situations in which the refusal constitutes an abuse by the patent owner, or any time the latter refuses to deal.

Even when a literal interpretation of the Section would suggest the latter alternative, legal scholars support the former option, as it is the one in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement and the Competition Law. A patent in and of itself does not necessarily create market power because substitutes for the patented products may well exist. If the adjudicatory agency of the Competition Law determines that the patentee has engaged in anticompetitive practices, it shall inform the INPI, which then publishes a notice in the Official Gazette, informing third parties that they can make an offer for a licence.

The INPI will then consider the offers and decide whether or not to grant a compulsory licence. Several cases considered under former competition laws examined the issue of refusals to license in an IPR context. For example, in Pramer SCA, a programming company was ordered to continue its commercial relationship with a local cable-TV operator.

The plaintiff filed a claim with the CNDC, alleging that the refusal to license was directed at benefiting an affiliate of the defendant, who was the plaintiff's main competitor in the cable-TV market. The CNDC granted an injunction in favour of the plaintiff, and the parties ultimately reached a commercial agreement. In order to prevent refusals to license similar to that described above, in some merger cases e.

In the particular case of football events, Law No. Exclusive licensing of sought-after products has been disfavoured by the CNDC. For example, in HBO Ole Partners , the CNDC ordered a programming company to continue supplying its channels to a cable company pending a commercial dispute between the companies, to prevent potential massive transfers of consumers to a rival of the latter. In several cases, prospective buyers have argued that the requested price was so high as to amount to a refusal to deal.

Dayco Holdings Ltd , 14 the defendant held exclusive broadcasting rights to certain football matches of the Argentinian team during the World Cup. The plaintiff, a broadcasting company, filed a claim with the CNDC arguing that the defendant had refused to accept its offer for the purchase of a non-exclusive broadcasting licence for one particular match. Additionally, the plaintiff requested injunctive relief that would have required the defendant to permit the broadcasting, at market prices, of that match as well as subsequent ones in which the Argentinian team participated.

The CNDC ordered the rights holder to license on 'non-discriminatory terms'. This order was insufficient from the plaintiff's perspective because the parties could not reach an agreement on price.

No sanction was ultimately imposed because the court found that the refusal was based on the existence of unpaid debt of the cable company to the programmer rather than any abuse of dominance. A behaviour that directly exploits customers or suppliers, as, for example, through excessively high prices or price discrimination, may be found abusive if performed by a party with a dominant position.

The plaintiff, an entity grouping all hotels and restaurants in Argentina, accused SADAIC of arbitrarily increasing the royalties charged to the plaintiff's members for the reproduction of musical works in hotels. The complaint also alleged that SADAIC had discriminated between the hotels, as, in some cases, agreements including substantial discounts had been entered into with some establishments. SADAIC was ultimately imposed a fine of over 42 million Argentine pesos, representing 10 per cent of its total turnover for secondary reproduction of musical works during the period from to In its final decision, the competition agency recommended the Executive Power to establish a new royalty system based on reasonableness, non-discrimination, transparency and equity criteria.

It also recommended a further review of royalty tables or regulations applicable to users carrying out public execution of works and related rights, especially in cases where the same user, category or group of users must pay duties to more than one collective rights association, and the disparity of royalties or their associated formula, or their accumulation, may have an unreasonable impact on economic activity.

Generally, cross-licensing and patent pools will not infringe the Competition Law. They might even enhance competition, as patent pools may increase the number of competitors with the right to use particular inventions. Certain terms cannot be imposed, however, as provided for in Section 38 of the Patent Law. Furthermore, depending on market circumstances, on whether the patents complement or compete with one another, and on the manner in which such conditions are implemented, such arrangements may run afoul of the Competition Law in particular cases.

We are not aware of relevant case law involving antitrust issues in software or trademark licensing in Argentina, other than the trademark licensing cases previously mentioned.

We are not aware of regulations addressing standard-essential patents in Argentina. Notwithstanding this, if a dominant position was identified due to an essential patent holding, a rule of reason approach would be followed by the authority. Conduct encompassing both exclusionary and exploitative dominant position is under the scope of the Competition Law and, as anticipated, both cases are analysed by the rule of reason approach. Some authors are of the view that the type of exclusionary abuse produced in these cases could be examined under the 'essential facility doctrine'.

Additionally, under Section 44, the Patent Law lists conduct that, if verified, can lead to the issuance of mandatory licences by the adjudicatory authority. Decree No. Notwithstanding this, at present, IRAM has no specific disposition addressing the relationship between the normalisation system created by Decree No. A case worth mentioning involving standards is Quilmes, where a brewing company accused its largest competitor of exclusionary abuse of dominance after said company decided to launch a new proprietary returnable bottle to the market.

The plaintiff claimed the existence of a de facto industry standard for cm3 glass bottles, which were freely interchangeable among brewers, and that the launching of a new format by the dominant player increased the costs to consumers to switch to competing brands consumers obtained a cash credit by redeeming empty glass bottles of the existing industry standard variety. The CNDC ultimately approved a complex settlement between the parties, whereby, inter alia, both companies agreed to: 1 launch their own proprietary bottles; 2 not transfer the cost of separating and exchanging containers to the sale price; 3 prioritise the interchangeability of standardised containers; and 4 educate and inform retailers.

Similar measures can be issued by a court at the request of the agency. Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory FRAND terms are not specifically established in any regulation. However, these terms can be deduced from Section 44 of the Patent Law. Also, several cases, especially those related to vertical mergers, include FRAND-type provisions in the form of behavioural undertakings.

There are no specific provisions regulating anticompetitive royalties in the standard-essential patent context. Section 44 of the Patent Law, however, expressly considers excessive or discriminatory royalties as anticompetitive acts leading to compulsory licensing.

Such royalties may also be considered in violation of the Competition Law as a type of exploitative or exclusionary abuse of dominance. Mergers and acquisitions must be mandatorily reported for review and approval where the enterprises involved in the transaction the target company, the acquiring company and companies with a relationship of control with it have a turnover in excess of million 'mobile units' each unit currently has a value of In particular, the CNDC has been of the view that the transfer of a trademark constitutes an economic concentration as long the other requirements established by the Competition Law are fulfilled when the same is being used at the time of the transfer — as it is associated with a certain turnover 19 — or, even if the brand is not active by the time of the transfer, if it is deemed to have a market value.

Sometimes, the approval of a merger involves the transfer of IPRs. A more recent case, involving the merger of Anheuser Bush Inbev ABI and SabMiller, was approved upon ABI entering into an agreement with its main competitor in Argentina, which had opposed the merger, whereby ABI would transfer to said competitor all SabMiller brands plus some of ABI's own brands, in exchange for the payment of cash and the early termination of a pre-existing manufacturing and licensing agreement between ABI and said competitor regarding Budweiser, one of ABI's flagship brands.

Similarly, in the acquisition of the dry pasta business of Mondelez Argentina and Intercontinental Brands by Molinos, comprising four brands and two production plants, the acquirer was ordered to sell one of the brands, which it did, to a viable competitor. Even when there is no specific provision addressing sham or vexatious IP litigation as an antitrust infringement, this practice can be considered anticompetitive as a type of exclusionary abuse Section 3 d of the Competition Law.

One case dealing with this conduct in IP litigation is Productos Roche. In its defence, Roche submitted that it had justified claims on the plaintiff's drug safety, as it had not undergone clinical trials before obtaining the relevant regulatory approval. Given the fact that both the plaintiff's and the defendant's drugs were substitutes, and that doctors might prescribe the drug by identifying its active ingredient and not its trade name, in the event of a harm caused to a patient from the indistinct administration of any of the two products, it would be impossible to determine which drug caused the harm and, therefore, Roche could be subject to potential claims that might also jeopardise its image and prestige.

In its review, the CNDC stated that what characterises sham litigation is the way the exclusionary conduct is carried out; namely, resorting to judicial or governmental mechanisms without a legitimate interest. Furthermore, it stated that, for a conduct to constitute sham litigation, there is no need for the commencement of multiple proceedings, given that is the anticompetitive intention and the claimant's knowledge of the illegitimacy of its claim is what characterises this conduct.

The CNDC suggested that, when the conduct implies the commencement of only one proceeding, the criteria used by US courts could be used; namely:. The first requirement would not be configured if there is at least a probable cause to litigate.

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